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A B S T R A C T 
The paper is a survey of recent developments on this topic. 
It uses a two-sector (modern and traditional) model as the "basic framework 
for analysis. Agriculture's role in development is reviewed "briefly, as 
arc the methods"of transferring resources from agriculture: transfers on 
private account, government tax and expenditure policies, and policies 
aimed at changing the terms of trade of the agricultural sector. 
The "bulk of the paper reviews- the recent experience of develop-
ing countries and the literature related to this topic. It is organized 
around three "basic themes. First is a review of the policies including 
tariff protection that have influenced the domestic terms of trade "between 
agriculture and industry and the effects of those policies on the 
agricultural sector (which has usually "been left to pay the "bill for 
protected industrialization). Second is a discussion of the implications 
of productivity growth (or the lack of it) in "both the agricultural sector 
and in protected import substituting industries for the questions of 
resource transfers and Of general economic growth in both sectors« 
K r d , the growing concern with unemployment and income distribution is 
reviewed in connection with the choice of policies to tax agriculture and 
transfer resources to industry® 
The paper suggests a number of elements of an improved system 
of taxing the agricultural sector to transfer resources both to government 
and to the non-agricultural sectors while simultaneously reducing the 
burden on agriculture from misallocation effccts of the policies. 
Attention is also given to policies that would improve the growth rate 
of employment and the distribution of income. Particular attention 
in the paper is given to the effects of foreign trade policies on income 
t ransfers. 
AGRICULTURAL TAXATION AMD BTTSRSECTORAL RESOURCE TRANSFERS 
Stephen R, Lewis, Jr. 
m i R ^ U C T I j l T 
The techniques of taxing the agricultural sector in the Less 
Developed Countries (LDCs) have not changed much in the five years since-this 
topic was last reviewed,"'" There have "been a number of changes, however, 
in the underlying conditions facing many LDCs, particularly those associated 
with rapid productivity gains of the "Green Revolution" and with urban and 
rural unemployment and related social—political problems, In addition, a 
large number of empirical studies of the experience of the developing 
countries have appeared in the past five years, Both the changes in conditions 
in the LDCs and the growth of knowledge about the effects of various policies 
on economic behavior have substantial- implications, for the discussion of 
appropriate devices for taxing the agricultural sector. 
In this paper 1 first explain how 1 view agriculture in the 
process of .growth. Then I review the purposes of making resource 
transfers from agriculture- and various instruments that can, in principle 
be used to tax the agricultural sector, directly or indirectly. Then, 
in section IV, I review some of the changes in concerns and conditions that 
have emerged recently and some of the recent literature on the develop-
ment process and development policies relevant to our topic. Section 
V contains some proposals for the elements of a better system for taxing 
agriculture and transferring resources from it, in the light of recent-
experience and lessons I think we have learned. There are some final 
observations in the last section. 
A,GPJCjTLTjjRE IN EC (STCEIC GROWTH 
In analysing the growth of agriculture in most LDCs, and 
particularly xn discussing basic policy options, I continue to find the 
two-sector model developed by ¥» Arthur Lewis most helpful.2 It has now 
* Peter N. Hopcraft and John H, Power provided both useful 
comments on a draft of the paper and helpful discussions of the issues, 
for which they should be thanked but not implicated. 
•boon followed, "by a large number of models offering refinements and 
amendments,"'' and most of these capture a good number of the essentials 
of Arthur Lewis' contribution,, though generally without the .richness 
of his paper. In the context of the Arthur Lewis model, agricultural 
growth is crucial for two reasons. First, it is virtually impossible 
to have sustained growth of real income per capita, with some concern 
for the distribution of income, without having increases in agricultural 
production and in agricultural productivity. Agriculture is simply too 
large in the total economy for the situation to be otherwise; and the 
studies of development by Kuznets and others have demonstrated amply 
that rising agricultural productivity is intimately associated with 
rising incomes per head and with other characteristics of structural 
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transformation during development. 
The second reason for the central role of agricultural growth 
in economic development is instrumental: -it will be very difficult 
(though not in principal impossible) for the rest of the economy, 
particularly the non-agricultural modern s ectors, to grow rapidly in 
the absence of sustained growth in agriculture. Agriculture's 
"contributions" to development in other sectors which have been widely 
discussed,"^  include feeding a growing non-agricultural labor force, 
earning more foreign exchange, providing capital for development of the. 
rest of the economy, serving as a growing market for domestic manufac-
turing, etc. As emphasized in earlier discussions, of agriculture's, role, 
these latter contributions by agriculture depend not on total agricultural 
production but on.the marketed surplus of agricultural products. And, 
in the short run it. may be possible to increase agriculture's contri-
butions to non—agricultural growth even with relatively constant . . . . . . . . . 4 
production if the marketed surplus can be increased, 
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In the "normal'1 working of the Arthur Lewis model;, the 
expansion of the capital stock in the modem sector provides 
employment for labor which otherwise would have to be absorbed by the 
traditional sector; the resources for increasing the capital stock come 
from the surplus of total value added over wage payments (which are 
assumed to be totally consumed;; income per head rises as labor is 
moved from lower to higher marginal productivity occupations and as a 
consequence the share of the modem sector rises in total output; and 
the share of saving in income also rises.as the modern sector share 
rises in total income. The classical phase of the model comes to an 
end happily in the 11 well behaved5' case where, wages in the modem sector 
begin to rise, because so. much labor has been transferred from 
traditional to modern sectors that traditional 'sector labor becomes 
genuinely scarce, A recent Fei-Eanis addition to the model also 
describes the behavior of export•• composition in this well-behaved 
development of a two-sector econemy,"*". 
Some important aspects of the model are seen, however, when • 
all does not go well, • particularly, when food supplies to the modem 
sector do not expand as rapidly-as the modem sector's demand for- labor. . 
In that case, the modern, .sector has to give up a larger share of its 
output in order to feed its labor force, leaving fewer resources for 
capital formation. And, it is here that some of the major policy choices 
have had to be made by various governments in the past decades,. More 
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food can be forced out of agriculture in the short run, but the long-
run problem becomes one of ensuring a sustained growth of food supplies 
to support the growing modem sector. Again, the ?ei-ltanis" contribution"" 
is helpful in exploring some of the options open to a government facing 
food shortages in the short run. 
A second problem with the "normal" working of the model has 
also become apparent in recent years in some countries. In his 
original contribution Arthur Lewis pointed out that tho model would 
f-
come to an early end if real wages (in terms of modern sector output) 
rose before "unlimited-labor" had become exhausted, since the increase 
in wages would result in a diminution of surplus and a failure of tho 
capital stock to increase rapidly enough-to absorb labor from agriculture. 
More rcoently Lewis has pointed out in several contribution'1' that this 
has been a substantial problem in a number of real situations® Again 
it is worth emphasizing that accelerated development requires more 
resources, and that those resources have generally come from a surplus 
of value"added over wage payments in socialist, capitalist, and mixed 
economies. I must confess to a personal worry-that the recent and long 
overdue concern for more equitable income distribution may tend to 
obscure the important fact that resources for development must bo found 
somewhere, and it is unlikely that they will' bo found in tho voluntary-
saving of wage laborers or of the salaried*middle classes. In addition, 
while the short-run effect of rising wages and salr-.rios':will be to cut 
into modern sector surplus, numerous authors have pointed out that tho 
intermediate run incentive may be to recapture some of the surplus through 
capital—labor substitution, which will have adverse effects in terms of 
tho amount of labor absorbed in higher'productivity sectors per unit of 
surplus generated. The'relevance of this process for agriculture is being 
discussed in other papers for this conference, and will be referred to 
2 below as well. 
TRANSFER OF RESOURCES FROM AGHIGULTU^, 
Two aspects of agriculture's contribution to saving and to 
government revenue may be distinguished. One is the question of how 
'agriculture may contribute to total tax revenue and to total domestic 
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saving. This is the question that preoccupied me in an earlier review. 
The second question is whether agriculture should be making a net 
contribution to a flow of capital or government services to other 
sectors.; i.e. what is the optimal, lev.el_.and composition of net 
transfers from agriculture? 
There are three basic methods of transferring income from 
agriculture into a ''fund1 of saving and of taxes, First, there may be 
voluntary saving by individuals and firms in the agricultural sector. 
If private investment in agriculture falls short of the saving'generated, 
agriculture will have made a net contribution to financing investment 
in non-agricultural sectors. Second, the government may tax agriculture 
directly (with income or land taxes) or through indirect taxes on items 
agriculture buys or sells (particularly export taxes in the latter case)'. 
The government may then provide capital projects for agriculture or under-
take a variety of current expenditures or subsidies that benefit agri-
culture. The net of taxation from agriculture (which "requires some 
incidence assumptions) over the expenditures benefiting agriculture 
(which also requires some incidence assumptions) would be agriculture's 
contribution to the non-agricultural sectors on government account. 
Third, the government may turn the terms of trade against agriculture 
(relative to some meaningful standard) by a variety of policies reviewed 
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elsewhere. The beneficiaries of the adverse terms of trar>e for agri-
culture will be the non-agricultural sectors domestically (after netting 
out any indirect taxes that fall partly on agriculture and partly on non-
agriculture) . To the extent that the increased non-agricultural incomes 
are saved at a higher marginal rate than the decreased agricultural incomes, 
aggregate saving rates will increase, and^.agriculture will have made a 
net contribution" to ' totaL-sa-vi-n,o;; in an indirect manner,. In addition, the' 
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government can tax the increased non-agricultural incomes to capture 
part for government revenue, in which case a recalculation of agri-
cultural and non-agricultural contributions to government revenue needs 
to be undertaken. 
The size of the net transfer of resource from agriculture is 
both difficult to measure and difficult to evaluate in terms of its 
optimality. The data requirements to make an estimate are substantial; 
one must make estimates of incidence of taxes and of the benefits of 
government current and capital expenditures; and one must have in mind 
some notion of the '^ .appropriate" terms of trade between the sectors in 
order to .have a standard of comparison with which to measure the actual 
terms of trade. Finally, assuming that each sector would adjust the 
level and composition of its output, inputs., and scales with changes in 
relative prices facing it, one should have estimates of supply and 
demand elasticities to- enable one to measure the value of resource flows 
that actually took place as compared with those .that might have under 
different sets of relative prices, T.H. Lee's monumental study of 
Taiwan's experience"1" mee+s most, but not all, of these exacting 
requirements in attempting to assess the size, composition, and direction 
of the..resource flows from agriculture. The question of the optimal level 
of resource transfer is even more difficult to assess. 
Optimal levels of resource transfer from agriculture will 
undoubtedly vary from.country to county and within countries over time; 
and there are also likely to be situations in which the gross level 
of - agricultural contribution to government revenue may be inadequate 
to-meet the service needs of agriculture itself. Thus, the level of 
resource transfer (taxes plus other transfers) from agriculture could 
be (i) "too small" in the.. sense that higher-productivity uses of capital 
and of current government services in the non-agricultural sectors are 
left unexploited; or (ii) 'too small" in the sense that the government 
sector is unable to provide (without reducing higher—productivity uses 
of resources in non—agriculture) high—yielding public'current-or capital-
services to agriculture; or (iii) "too large" in the sense that' the 
agricultural sector is unable to finance higher-productivity activities 
and instead 1ower—productivity investments are taken up in non—agricul-
tural sectors. In addition to these largely self-evident definitions of 
optimality in terms of maximum growth of output,' there could be additional 
considerations introduced on the-income distribution side, with transfers 
from agriculture "too large" or "too small" in terms of distributional, 
goals. 
Tho optimality of various resource transfers from agriculture 
obviously depends on the goals of the society and "on existing conditions 
regarding the distribution of income and the productivity of investment 
and of current government expenditures in tho agricultural relative to 
other sectors of the economy.^ However, in view of the large weight of 
agriculture in the LDCs, and the imperatives of' structural transformation 
during development, I believe there is a presumption that the net flow 
of resources will in general be in the direction of- optimality when 
agriculture is making a contribution to the financing of other sectors. 
And, it is quite possible that within a not overall outflow of resources, 
government may make net inputs from tho public sector. There may be 
times, though, when a confluonce of circumstances (e.g. high—yielding 
agricultural varieties that substantially raise tho productivity of capital 
in .large-scale irrigation, drainage, storage, and transport facilities 
for some period of time) might make a temporary resource transfer into 
agriculture sensible from the point'Of overall growth.- -Thus, within an 
overall net outflow, there are sfcill questions of timing and of•composition 
which are more complex. 
V ARE LESSCTTS FROF RECEI-iT HISTORY? 
There are three themc-s in recent economic history and in 
recent studies around which I will organize some developments and 
concerns relating to the taxation and resource transfer questions. 
First, it has. "become .abundantly clear that government policies can 
markedly affect the terms of trade of agriculture and other relative 
prices; that such changes in relative prices can result in substantial 
transfers of income among sectors; and that entrepreneurs in all sectors 
of tho economies of LDCs respond quite rapidly to changes in.relative 
prices, both of inputs and factors and of output. Second, concerns about 
productivity growth that preoccupied economists somewhat earlier in 
developed country studies have begun to concern economists in LDCs, 
Rapid productivity growth in agriculture has in some cases substantially 
increased price elasticities of supply; and, such growth has also 
exacerbated some problems of income distribution and of direct taxation 
of the agricultural sector. In addition, the failure of total factor 
productivity to grow rapidly in import-substituting manufacturing sectors 
has resulted in high and growing .burdens cn the sectors that must subsidize 
protected industry,1 Third, and related to the first two, there has been 
growing unemployment and related unrest in a large number of LDCs, and there 
has boon a substantial increase in concern for the distribution, as opposed 
to the growth, of income in the LDCs, These three themes arc extremely 
important in thinking about appropriate policies for taxation and 
resource transfers for tho next decade, and some of tho evidence on each 
of them must be reviewed first. 
S£Te_cts, ojf ..Polj^ cy..pn_ Relat iye . Pricos 
• The impact of government policies in changing relative prices 
immediately .raises, the question: changing- thpm from.what? Existing 
studies have used two different definitions of the situation with which 
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to compare the price structure at some point in time. One set of studies 
emphasising the protection aspects of the problem, has used international 
relative prices facing the country, or international trade opportunity 
costs. The other set of studies has used the structure of domestic 
prices in some base period. These latter have generally been concerned . 
primarily or exclusively with the domestic terms of trade of agriculture 
and their movements relative to base period prices. The former have been 
concerned with the extent to which domestic relative prices differ 
from international prices, but have been primarily concerned with one 
year only. The data requirements to do any one of these studies are 
formidable indeed, and data "availability undoubtedly explains why most 
studies comparing domestic and foreign price structures have been 
single- year studies, while those that have been" concerned with movements 
of prices over time have been largely confined to movements of relative 
prices domestically. 
The appropriate price comparisons when we are interested in 
the possible distorting effects of policies are between domestic 
price ra.tios and the set of prices (of, where appropriate, marginal 
revenues) the country faces in international markets.1" If one is-
interested in agriculture's terms of trade under a given policy regime, 
the relevant set of prices with which to compare actual prices- received 
and paid by agriculture is the set of prices agriculture would have faced 
had there not been particular policies with respect to foreign., trade 
taxes, domestic taxes, and exchange rates that distorted the domestic ; 
price structure from that which would face the country in international 
trade. The comparison of the domestic terms of trade today with the 
domestic terms of trade in some past period may be of interest for .sc. ^e , 
purposes. But, it does not present an alternative set of prices which 
could have been paid or received by agriculture today in the way allowed, 
by comparison of today's domestic with today'Vinternational prices.. 
10 
Thus, if we are interested in the effects of policies on relative prices 
and on income transfers accomplished by means of changing agriculture's 
terms of...trade, we should compare the terms of trade agriculture actually 
faces with those it would have faced had not distorting trade policies 
intervened.. 
An example may be helpful here. Suppose one limited hisf k^r 
attention to movements in domestic prices only, and suppose the 
government followed a policy of using no indirect taxes or subsidies 
(except to correct for world demand elasticities of sigrificantly less 
than infinity) and had a floating exchange rate. And, suppose under 
these circumstances we observed a deterioration in agriculture's terns 
of trade of twenty percent over a decade. Given the policy assumptions, 
the deterioration in the domestic terms of trade could have come about 
only because of a deterioration of world prices of similar agricultural 
goods produced domestically relative to world prices of manufactured 
goods purchased by the domestic agricultural sector. Domestic government 
policy per se has made no impact in terms of transferring resources from 
agriculture to manufacturing, even though the latter has clearly benefited 
from the movements of the terms of trade. The only way in which to • 
maintain the earlier terms of trade for the domestic agricultural sector 
is to intervene with taxes and subsidies to protect (i.e. subsidize) 
agriculture and discriminate against (i.e. tax) manufacturing relative 
to existing international prices in the latter period, 
Recent studies indicate that government policies have indeed 
had major effects on the structure of domestic (relative to world) prices, 
and that substantial amounts of income have been transferred both between 
sectors and between producers of different goods within sectors in many 
countries. Detailed comparative studies of a number of LDCs done by a 
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group of consultants to the World Bank focussed on the impact of 
indirect taxes, exchange rate policies, tariffs, and quantitative 
restrictions on imports in protecting or subsidizing various activities 
at the expense of others,1 Manufacturing industry was generally the 
beneficiary and agriculture the sector discriminated against, but within 
each sector there were a variety of sub-sectors subsidized and others 
"taxed1' by the protective system. In some extreme cases, activities 
were found that yielded negative returns to domestic factors when the 
tradable oi^ tput -and the tradable inputs of the sector wore evaluated at 
international rather than domestic prices, so that real national income 
would be higher if the activities simply ceased to exist, 
This has generally been the result of tariff "cascading", with 
a lower price of foreign exchange implicit in prices of inputs than in 
prices of output. 
The studies done by a group associated with the Development 
Center of the OECD. summarized, interpreted, and extended in the 
volume by Little, Scitovsky and Scott, focussed broadly on manufacturing 
and trade policies, and made it clear that policies that favored \ 
manufacturing in many countries did so at the expense of agriculture, 
By re-calculating GDP at international instead of domestic relative 
prices, Little et.al. found that agriculture was subsidizing manufacturing 
from ten to twenty percent or more of agricultural value added as a. 
result of trade policies. My own studies in Pakistan' indicated that 
in the 1950s perhaps as much as ten to fifteen percent of agricultural 
income was being transferred out due to adverse terms of trade relative 
to world pieces. Sadie's examination of Austria-Hungary4' in the late 
19th and early 20tli century (which is the only study I am aware of which 
explicity takes into account the supply response along agriculture's offer 
curve in response to changes in terms of trade) suggested that from 
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seventeen to forty-five percent of agricultural exports except major 
grains was transferred from Hungarian agriculture in ihtra-Empire trade 
as a result of protectionist policies favoring Austrian manufacturing. 
T.K. Lee's study of Taiwan, while using domestic base 
period prices instead of international prices as the point of comparison 
indicates that the deterioration of agriculture's terms of trade for* the 
1950s and 19b0s as compared with the base period in the 1930s involied 
an implicit (or, as he says, invisible) transfer from agriculture 
equivalent to half to two-thirds of the real capital outflow fr«m agriculture 
2 
in the latter two decades, Echevarria's study of Ghile, differs from 
others by looking at changes in relative prices (including changes in 
international prices of goods actually traded) over several sub-periods 
and by calculating the transfer of resources involved in changes during 
the period from prices existing in the immediately preceeding period, 
Ee found agriculture as a whole gained as much as fifteen percent of its 
value added from changes in relative prices from 1959/61 to 1962/64, which 
suggests a similar loss of income in the earlier period relative to the 
later one. 
The amounts of resources transferred from agriculture through 
the use of trade and indirect tax policies, then, have been very 
substantial in relation to agricultural output in a large number of 
countries. The amounts are even larger in importance relative to the size 
of direct agricultural taxes, industrial output, or government revenue 
and expenditures. 
What should have been the consequences of these large gross 
transfers? In'the context of the two-sector model, depressing agriculture's 
terms of trade and improving them for the modern sector should have 
improved the saving rate and rate of investment for the economy, the 
rate of growth in output and employment in the modem sector, and the rate 
- 15 
of growth of output of the economy as a whole. The principal adverse 
effects, recognized much earlier, might have been disincentives and lack 
of investment resources in agriculture which would result in inadequate 
growth of agricultural output and marketed surplus and eventual decele-
ration of the growth of the modern sector.1 
Instead, however, the principal difficulty encountered by 
countries following the policy of turning the terms of trade against 
agriculture is the inefficiency with which the non-agricultural sectors 
used the transferred resources. Because of the nature of trade policies 
in a large number of countries, the set of relative prices facing the 
manufacturing sector encouraged the establishment of industries aimed .. 
primarily at the. domestic market,- using imported (or exportable) raw• 
materials and capital goods purchased at favorable exchange rates compared 
to the exchange rate implicit in the prices at which they sold output. 
The nominal extent to which domestic prices of import substitutes 
exceeded their international prices (c.i.f.) substantially understated, 
the extent of subsidy to value added in the import substituting industries 
If the import substituting sectors had raised, profits by the full amount 
of their subsidy from protection, and_if profits were heavily reinvested, 
then - the mechanism for accelerating development .through the use of trade 
restricting devices as suggested in the proceeding paragraph probably 
would have .worked (except for possible adverse effects on agriculture 
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as mentioned) However, in most countries which have had detailed studies 
of protection, a substantial portion of the increase in gross returns 
to the firm made possible by the structure of protection subsidized the 
inefficient use (from the point of view of the economy as a whole) of 
4 
capital, labor, and intermediate inputs.' Thus, a continuing subsidy 
to the industries became necessary simply to support the level of output 
•and value added in such industries. And, therefore, the agricultural 
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sector.was being "taxed" not to increase overall saving in the economy, 
but rather to give an on-going subsidy to industries that would have 
been unaWc to compete in international markets, even with a corrcction 
for the overvaluation of currencies that existed in countries following 
this pattern of "growth". 
The first problem with a price distorting strategy, then, is 
that it may encourage tho establishment of industry that is inefficient 
in a static context. But, the dynamic problems that have arisen often 
have been of greater consequence. The infant industry justification for 
protection (which was invoked along with the "raising saving rates" 
argument already explored) assumes that costs will fall in the newly 
established industry over some period of time. If the costs do not fall, 
however, the industry will need.a continuing subsidy in order to keep, 
[producing at its initial levels of profitability. Thus, once such an 
industry is established, it becomes a permanent drag on the rest of the 
economy. And, in order to provide protection or subsidy to a new sector, 
or to allow a transfer of income from agriculture that would increase 
profits (and by assumption, saving) the squeeze on agriculture would 
have to be increased. Alternatively put, if costs do not fall in an 
import substituting sector that is growing, the sector requires a growing 
subsidy from the sectors of the eoonomy (primarily agriculture) that 
produce tradables efficiently just to maintain its growing levels of 
production.1 If agriculture is unable to provide such a growing subsidy, 
there will bo a diminution in tho growth rate of the import-substituting 
sector, since it will not be able to expand without the subsidy; unless, 
of course, it is able to increase the productivity with which it uses 
all resources. 
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! Little, Scitovsky and Scott have put the problem in another 
way,1 They point oat that the contribution of the sectors that are 
<being subsidized is overstated by the use of domestic-price value 
i -
1 added relative to the contribution of the sector measured at international 
\ prices. In like manner, the contribution of the sectors that are 
discriminated against is understated by the use of domestic prices, 
Heestimating the value added in the major sectors in international 
instead of domestic prices raises the weight of the "taxed" (and usually 
more slowly growing) sectors and lowers that of the "'subsidized" (and 
more rapidly growing) sectors, thus lowering the rate of growth of the 
economy as a whole. Economists.studying import substituting industria-
lization have been concerned with explanations for the acceleration, 
followed by a deceleration, in industrial growth rates (the latter phase 
often accompanied by greater hfLationary pressure and more severe balance 
N 2 
of payments problems;,. With the re-measurement of overall growth rates, 
the acceleration phase is seen to be largely illusory growth, or a 
statistical artifact; while the deceleration indicates that the size of 
the subsidy .required to keep the import-substituting sector going has 3 
oecome too large for xhe more efficient sectors to maintain, 
A second difficulty with the use of the transfer from 
agriculture has_pccurred where_jreal urban wage rates have risen, 
particularly in the import-subsitituting sectors, well before, the end of 
''unlimited labor", In these cases (and there is a growing list of 
countries where this is of concern) the transfer from r.g-H nni tii-pp has 
resulted not in- increased saving or.increased.government revenue, but in 4 
increased consumption by the urban labor force. When this use of the 
transfer is v„dded to that absorbed by inefficient use of intermediate 
products and of factors, the amount left for the increase of private or 
government saving is further diminished. Thus, in countries where these 
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forces have been at work in the non-agricultural sectors, the squeeze on 
agriculture, which has been real and sizable, has not been growth-
fostering in the ways that a simpler view of the two sector model 
would suggest. 
A further set of problems engendered by price-distorting 
policies is related to the fact that all agricultural prices are not ' 
depressed relative to all manufactured goods prices when the terms of 
trade overall have moved against agriculture. We have already mentioned 
the effect of tariff "cascading' (lower rates of duty on capital and 
intermediate products than on final consumption goods) on the inef-
ficient use of resources in the manufacturing sector. In addition 
within agriculture there have been wide differences in the impact of 
trade, tariff and price policies. Fumerous studies have shown how 
quickly farmers in the LDCs adjust to changes in relative prices among 
[agricultural products that compete for similar resources. It is not 
'surprising therefore, to find trade-distorting policies resulting in 
inefficient use of resources within agriculture, particularly discrimi-
nation against export crops end in favor of crops that are import 
substitutes. Also, the distortions in product and factor prices that 
have vled to a growing concern for efficient use of capital in the 
manufacturing"sectors of many'LDCs raise similar problems with respect 
to agriculture. The protective systems, and the overvalued currencies they 
defend, usually have left capital goods both for manufacturing and for 
agriculture with very favorable exchange rates from the point of view of 
users of these goods. This type of policy has probably had an adverse 
impact botli on the substitution of capital for labor in using activities, 
on the composition of industries by labor intensity, and on the develop-
ment of capital goods industries, about which we shall say more below. 
Even in the absence of "substitution, the subsidized price of capital goods 
has provided anincome transfer to users of capital goods from the rest of 
socie by. 
Growth of P r o d u o t i x i J z 
Certainly tho most dramatic events of the past five years in 
tho LDCs are related to the Green Revolution, and the impact of such 
rapid productivity growth in some parts of agriculture on problems of 
taxation and resource transfer that concern us here. One of the most 
obvious impacts has been the effect on domestic relative prices of 
agricultural commodities, a subject treated by other papers at this 
conference. These changes in domestic production costs and relative 
prices arc directly related to the problems of tho last subsection, 
though with an interesting set of twists. 
If governments try to maintain some historical level of 
relative domestic prices (especially for import—substitute products, 
such as food grains on the South Asian Subcontinent) in the face of 
falling domestic costs, there 'rfill be substantial subsidies from some parts 
of agriculture and those parts of non—agriculture that are efficient 
producers of tradable goods.1 
To tho extent that resources arc substitutable, resources will 
be drawn out. of su"h—isectors .of agriculture that are efficient producers 
of tradables into those sectors in.which real costs are falling but price 
2 
arc being prevented from doing so. Studies in Pakistan have suggested 
that tho introduction on the new varieties may make cropping patterns even 
more sensitive to changes in relative prices than they had been under 
traditional conditions; just as political pressures build up to prevent 
endogenous changes in relative prices, the need to make sure that prices 
reflect opportunity costs becomes even more important. 
Another aspcct of the'rapid increase in productivity in some 
parts of LDC agriculture has boon that the long-standing problem of a lack 
of income-elastic taxes on agriculture has been made even worse. Those 
countries with land-based taxes and relatively long pefiods between 
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re-assessment of the base for taxation have experienced substantial 
increases in agricultural incomes and. no way in the present structure 
of taxation to tap them. In addition, the political pressure to 
maintain the prices of the products in which the productivity increases 
have taken place, means a further drain 011 government resources to maintain 
subsidies or guaranteed price purchasing arrangements. Thus, assuming 
prices do not fall substantially, a tax policy question becomes: how do 
we capture some of the productivity gains in parts of agriculture for 
use by society as a whole."'" 
The possibility of rapid productivity growth in agriculture 
has another interesting dimension. As pointed out earlier, if there is little 
productivity growth in the protected non-agricultural sector, the expansion 
of that sector will require an increasing subsidy from agriculture (and 
from the efficient parts of non-agriculture) simply to keep going. The 
rapid growth of productivity in agriculture, then, can have an effect of 
postponing the time when non-agriculture has to become efficient. If the 
non-agricultural sector was really in the process of cutting its real 
cost of production, this extra breathing room before-balance-of-payments 
and other problems closed in would be welcome indeed. But, if the non-
agricultural sector were expanding, increasing its need for subsidy, and 
remaining an inefficient producer of tradaoles, the sudden increase in 
the growth rate of agriculture would simply enable the sector to put off 
the day of reckon ing and would be a waste of the productivity gains in 
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agriculture. 
Growth of productivity in agriculture has another dimension 
relevant to considerations both of efficiency and of equity. If rapid 
productivity growth puts downward pressure on the price of the commodity 
in question, it will have a depressing effect on the net barter terms of 
trade of agriculture. But, the income terms of trade need not deteriorate, 
a point ofton forgotten in discussions of the effect of the Green 
Revolution on farm welfare.1 In addition, since a very large fraction 
of farms in many LDCs are net purchasers.of food crops, the effects of 
productivity growth even with falling prices are likely to he favorable 
to farm welfare. Also, changes in the net barter terms of trade as a 
result of the fall in farm prices arising from productivity growth do not 
have decisive consequences for the incentive to use improved inputs or 
new techniques. The- expected payoff for improved inputs involves both 
the physical productivity of the inputs (rising with improved techniques) 
and the price of output (falling with new techniques) relative to the costs 
of tho input. So, while the net barter terms of trade are relatively-
easy to measure, that fact alone siiould not lead to its overemphasis in 
discussing policy options or their effects on output growth in agriculture. 
Finally, the now agricultural technologies have another effect 
on tho question of taxation, income transfers, and the net contribution 
that can bo expected from agriculture. Some aspects of the new varieties, 
at least, involve the need for more sophisticated (and expensive) water 
control sy-stems; in general, it appears that benefits from tho now 
technologies will be optimized only with increased use of fertilizers and 
pesticides, which increase the need for working capital in agriculture; 
even in "labor surplus" economies, the needs for preparation of fields 
more carefully and the increases in the size of harvests have led to a 
genuine (i.e. not caused b3r price distortions) need for investment in 
equipment of various kinds; and the increased input needs and physical 
output flows have created transport and storage problems which can be 
Solved only by additional capacity in either or both systems. Those | • • 
considerations suggest that the absolute allocation of private and public 
capital to agriculture may well have to go up to optimize growth for tho 
economy as a whole; but at tho same time, the growth of productivity-
20 
stemming from the-Green Revolution.makes agriculture better, able both 
to meet its own needs;and transfer capital to other sectors as well.1 
It would be dangerous to try to conclude anything i;in principle" about 
net transfers from or to agriculture in this set of conflicting 
pressures, 
Employment and Income Distribution•Questions 
The shortage of domestic saving was "the development problem" 
of the 1950s. It was replaced briefly by the need for education and 
training in the early 1960s, but that.gave way- to the scarcity of 
foreign exchange in the mid- to late 1960s. Since the problems of 
employment and of equitable distribution of income, appear to be the main 
focus. of attention a.t the- beginning, of a new decade, one can only hope 
that as a profession we will sort out the relevant from the irrelevant, 
and the helpful from the harmful, sooner than we have on these other 
problems. This subsection reviews a few of the aspects of employment and 
income distribution questions relevant to the problem addressed in this 
paper. 
A number of writers dealing with the Green Revolution have 
pointed out that to a large extent the initial beneficiaries of the 
new varieties and other new agricultural technologies have been the larger 
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farmers. Part of this has to do with progressiveness, part with ability 
to take risks, part with the need for working and perhaps fixed capital 
'•to exploit the new technologies. In any case, the new technologies seem 
to have increased the incomes of larger farmers faster than farm incomes 
as a whole. In addition, the new technologies have had a regional bias 
in some countries, most dramatically perhaps in Pakistan and India, which 
has added political strains of a different kind.'5 Thus,, the technological 
revolution in agriculture has created a need for the system of taking 
agriculture to tap the additional incomes which are exacerbating already 
2.1 
serious problems of.unequal income distribution. 
. -. An additional aspect of the income distribution question is 
the rise.of modern sector wages ahead of labor scarcity. When agriculture 
is squeezed in order to transfer income to. the urban .sectors;, the rationales 
of raising rates of saving and of employment growth are lost when the 
resources are absorbed by rising urban wage r?.tes. While the higher wage 
rates improve the income position of modern sector workers relative 
to large rural landlords and managerial classes in the cities, it does ' 
so at the expense.of parts of the agricultural sector that cannot boo„st 
such large incomes as the groups to which they are transferring income; 
and, whether from, the effects of reduced levels of saving and 
investment or from effects of capital-labor -subsitution resulting from 
higher wage rates, the employment opportunities in the modem sector -at 
higher wages "than available in traditional agriculture are diminished 
from what• they migh.t_hav:e_Jbeen. In. addition, since higher costs would 
limit competitiveness with some imports and "in exports, there is a 
reduction in demand for output which will also reduce employment 
opportunities. -So, some—aspects of an incomes policy for the modern 
sector are relevant to consideration of methods and levels of taxation 
3r-r" ~ — " 
of agriculture, 
-'rice distortions,in the agricultural-ond in the manufacturing 
sector are involved with questions both of income distribution and of 
employment growth. The overvaluation of currencies, bolstered by 
protective systems that leave prices of capital goods artificially low, 
in conjunction with interest rates facing- the modern - sector in both 
agriculture and manufacturing that substantially understate the opportunity 
cost of capital present, a package of conditions prevalent in a large 
number of countries.. It should not.be surprising, then,, to find countries 
where such conditions are present experiencing problems of unemployment -
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and unequal income distribution. This is particularly so in light of 
the experience of japan and Taiwan, and more, recently Korea, where, while, 
government policies encouraging industry and agriculture as well could 
hardly be called neutral, the peculiar problems of recurring balance of 
payments problems, unemployment, discrimination against exports, lack 
of local capital goods, etc. do not seem to be present in such abundance . 
as in other countries wuicli have pursued the somewhat stylized set of 
policies outlined herein. 
The kinds of policies that have sharply biased down .the price 
of capital and the price of capital goods, thus lowering the "user cost" 
of capital relative to labor have had three kinds of effects.. First, 
and most obvious, there is an inc^ative-far capital labor substitution^ 
especially in cases where the urban wage rate has moved well above the. 
traditional sector wage, but also in agriculture, where the wage rate 
may not be much above the opportunity cost .of labor, but the price of 
capital is heavily subsidized.1 This effect, then, reduces the amount 
of employment for any given industry structure, and for any given level 
of technology. Second-, the distorted prices of labor and capital would 
lead to a choice of industry'' structure inconsistent with the resource 
endowment of the country, further reducing tmplojTiiont b^low what it -could 
be with the available capital, and, in addition, putting pressure on the 
balance of payments from the inappropriate choice of techniques'-.and, 
where agriculture supplies most exports, placing an additional burden on 
agriculture as a whole). Third, and perhaps more subtle, tho failure to 
price imported' capital goods at their opportunity costs will discriminate 
aga„ihst the production of capital goods domestically, which may have - two 
effects; since capital goods industries are relatively labor intensive 
(in hand-skilled labor generally) a set of industries.is further discri-
minated against that would have provided more employment opportunities 
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(and more real output) per unit of capital than other industries; and 
since the locally made .capital goods would be more lil-iely to reflect 
local factor availabilities (and maintenance tolerances) the discrimi-
nation against local production of capital goods-will result in a capital 
stock embodying higher capital/labor ratios than would be the case with 
a larger proportion of locally produced capital goods in the total. 
A particularly vivid example of the kinds of .effects cited here 
are explored carefully and empirically in an excellent recent study by 
Kaneda and Child of the industries supplying capital goods to the 
agricultural sector in the Pakistan Punjab.1 They are able to include 
an additional, and in my view very important, aspect of the. problem 
since their study covered some firms that were relatively privileged ;r 
iri their access to capital and foreign exchange as well as a 
preponderance of firms that operate without such access (and, Indeed, for 
the most part without knowledge.of the authorities that they exist). It 
is impossible to do justice to the rich array of .data treated in their 
paper, but their findings certainly suggest that _(i) the privileged 
access (at low prices) to capital end to imported capital goods and 
materials has the effect of :increasing the use of these items even within 
the same industry (relative to firms that do not have access at subsidized 
prices); (ii) local firms produce capital equipment/that is more 
consistent with local resource, availabilities (including maintenance\ 
than is.the case with imported capital equipment; (iii) access to capital 
and to capital goods at low prices (from foreign credits provided -by aid 
agencies in this case) has induced larger farmers to adopt ;capital-using . 
and labor-displacing methods, while the capital goods produced by the 
local concerns tended to be labor-complementing, and were .sometimes used 
to break lacor bottlenecks at-harvest time; (iv) the allocation system 
for import® at the official exchange rate (which greatly undervalued 
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foreign exchange) had substantial adverse effects on the sxoa.ll and 
unprivileged firms, who were unable to get raw materials even at 
1 
premium prices. 
One final aspect of the income distribution and employment 
aspects of many economies relevant to the agricultural taxation 
question- relates to the distribution of land and the incentives to use 
land in production, land, more then most physical assets is a store of 
value and a speculative holding, Thus, part of the reason for holding 
land (apart from prestige and tradition) is unrelated to the return from 
current productive uses of land,- and it may be quite rational in the 
process of selecting and managing a portfolio of physical and-, financial 
assets not to maximize the current return to land. This would be more 
true the lower the marginal utility of current income to the owner, which, 
one would expect to be the case with the larger than the smaller landowners. 
The question arises, what o.re - the factors that might lead to less productive 
user of land, -and how could the tax System be used to discourage 'this 
and encourage more intensive use of land? 
A number of studies in different countries have indicated that 
larger farms are generally used less intensively (in terms of both 
output per acre and labor input per acre) than are smaller farms, even 
where farm is defined in terms of management -units rather than ownership 
2 
units. Where differences in output per acre .are small, there may 
still be differences in labor input per acre, the difference reflecting 
capital-labor substitution in larger management units. The pressure for 
current"income is less great on the larger farmers and landowners, 
land taxes have substantial income effects which tend to increase the 
application of other inputs so as to increase current output (as well 
as current marketings to pay the taxes in cash), and the evidence 
suggests that this majr have been an important factor in obtaining the 
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substantial contribution of- agriculture to development in Japan. 
The lack of a 1: uad .tax, then, or a land, tax with very low rates relative 
to current productive capacity of the land will tend to induce less 
intensive use of land for current production at all levels of land 
holdings, but presumably it will make the greatest difference with the 
larger landholders. 
There is a further problem which may contribute to the lack 
of intensive use of land especially by larger land holders in some 
countries. It is quite common for capital gains to be treated with 
preferential rates (relative to ordinary income) or to go untaxed 
completely. One can expect to make reasonably good after tax income by 
holding assets such as land even in an economy that is not undergoing 
rapid price level inQiation. If there are costs to getting current income 
from the land (management time that could better be spent on other parts 
of the asset portfolio, bother-with-tenants, if that is the principal other 
option, or just a feeling that one does not want to get tenants used to 
living on one's land for social-political reasons), it may be quite 
rational to leave land'uncultivated,- the more so the-lower the eventual ... 
tax _on_c.apital gains. 
If this general diagnosis is correct, the tax,-system might, be 
used to increase the employment opportunities for smaller tenants and 
landless" laborers at-the same time that'one made' the- tax' structure more 
progressive. The more progressive the tax on. capital gains, and the 
greater the progressiva ty of the land tax (by size of total holdings, 
presumably) the more costly it would become to rely on appreciation 
for income in the future'and the more costly it would be to hold-rland with 
low current levels of production and income; and the greater the pressure, 
would be 011 individual landowners, especially-larger ones, either to,., 
farm more intensively themselves, or to let more land to tenants, or to 
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sell off those parts of their land that, under the revised rules of 
the tax game, were no longer rational parts of their portfolio of assets. 
I have tried to review a variety of ways of transferring income 
out of agriculture,their costs and benefits, their side effects, and the 
conditions under which they have or have not been tried, before talking 
about the elements of tax and transfer policios that seem relevant for 
tho decade ahead. If the tone and emphasis of the section have been 
somewhat negative, it is because it seemed mere important to look at the 
common failures, and perhaps, too, because failures have been more numerous 
than successes. In addition, T.E. LoeTs major contribution to this 
literature has emphasized the particular successful methods used in 
Taiwan, and as he mil comment formally on this paper it seems both un-
necessary and presumptuous to dwell on the Taiwanese experience, 
MffifflTTS OF A 3ETTER SYSTEM .GF.TAjCCIG AqHICj?LTUIg 
In speaking of a "better" system, one must have in mind some 
set of criteria by which to judge methods. §nd levels) of income 
transfers from agriculture. This section first discusses the means of 
getting a gross transfer from agriculture to government and to non-
agriculture, and then goes on to deal briefly with the subsidy and 
expenditure side of the government budget. In tho discussion, "better" 
has reference to the critique of past pclicios in many countries with 
roforonce both to the adverse effects on long-run sustainable growth 
in agriculture and in the economy as a whole and to the adverse effects 
on tho size distribution of income and the opportunities for employment 
(or for "income opportunities"). The outline in this section is sketchy 
in part because of tho longer discussion in tho proceeding section.of the 
nature and effects of various policy instruments. 
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Exchange rate polio;* is intimately related, to questions of 
appropriate fiscal policjr and of income distribution and transfers * 
A crucial element in designing a "better system of taxing agriculture 
is the movement towards an exchange rate that more nearly approximates 
the real cost of foreign exchange to the economy, which in most LDCs -will 
involve raising the price of foreign exchangeSuch a move has a number 
of implications. Where exports arc predominately agricultural, this will 
reduce the implicit tax on agriculture from currency overvaluation. It 
will also improve the efficiency of resource allocation in agriculture where 
export crops must compete with import—substituting crops selling currently 
at a higher implicit exchange rate. In addition, in countries which have 
made a practice of selling foodgrains at prices above world levels, increased 
production from the "Green Revolution" has made the problem of maintaining 
these prices more difficult» If the possibility existed of export at 
prioes reflecting the opportunity cost of foreign exchange to the economy, 
there would be a floor to domestic prices which would have an economic 
meaning, and which would be self—financing in a way in which government ' 
guaranteed prices often are not. So, moving toward a less overvalued 
currency is also desirable in terms of easing transitional problems of 
sharp productivity increases in parts of agriculture. The move to more 
realistic exchange rates might be accompanied by use of selective export 
taxes so that producers and exporters would face world marginal revenue 
2 rather than world price. 
A closely related set of measures constitutes a second 
element in a better system of agricultural taxation: the reduction of the 
overall level of protection afforded to the non-agricultural sectors and 
a reduction in the spread of effective rates of protection in those 
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scctors. To a large extent, it is the high level of protection that has 
enabled countries to maintain exchange rates that understate the 
opportunity cost of foreign exchange to the economy; and a movement • 
toward a more realistic exchange rate would necessitate a change in . 
the levels of protection.1 Hie high and differentiated levels of-
a t " • 
protection afforded hen—agriculture in many countries has required a 
heavy burden of subsidy from agriculture. What is more important, the 
subsidy often has been used not to increase the rate of capital 
formation but has gone to a large extent to subsidize the inefficient 
use of resources by the non—agricultural sectors. The nominal increase 
in the prices agriculture pays for non-agricultural tradables 
(when compared with the prices received for agricultural tradables) 
measures, the gross income transfer from agriculture. What happens to the 
gross."transfer depends on (i) the extent to which the government takes 
a share of the total price paid-by agri-culture in the form of indirect 
taxes on output, (ii) the extent to which the net nominal protection 
(after.adjusting lor domestic indirect taxes.) is cascaded into higher 
levels of effective protection by differential tariffs on inputs and on 
output, and- (iii) how the producer "uses" the effective level of 
protection or subsidy on value added (as between earning maximum profits 
or relaxing productive efficiency thereby using larger amounts of labor 
and capital and earning "satisfactory" profits only). Government tax 
and exchange rate policies can have a major effect on the uses of any given 
level of gross transfer. In particular, a differentiated tariff structure, 
with lower rates of tariff on intermediate and capital goods than on 
finished products produced in the country, will increase the share of 
subsidy to value added for any given amount of nominal protection. Thus-, 
not only should an.aim of our "better system" bo one of reducing the 
nominal protection to the non—agricultural sectors, but it should also 
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be one of reducing the differentiation of the tariff structure, to make 
sure that less of agriculture's gross transfer subsidizes inefficiency 
of resource use in other sectors. 
,!£he third element of_an improved system would be on increased 
use of indirect taxes on the domestic production of manufactured goods. 
This is closely related to the reduction of net protection,, as domestic 
indirect taxes such as a purchase tax or a sales tax regardless of origin 
be used to raise the price to the purchaser without providing protection 
to domestic producers„ This type of policy has three separate objectives. 
First, it can be used as an across-the-board, tax to capture part of the 
income transfer for the government sector, Second, it can be . 
differentiated by categories of goods consumed by different income levels, 
without simultaneously increasing the incentive, to produce ••luxuries 
domestically. This would be desirable in order to introduce some 
progression into the tax system. Third, the purchase or,sales tax might 
be raised to reasonably high levels on maeh:mery and-equipment used in 
both- the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors for :!pure;: labor 
displacement. This latter would be difficult to define in many cases, 
but there the effort to do so would.seem well worth-while-in view of the 
capital-labor substitution which, buttressed by tied-aid arrangements 
with well-meaning bilateral and multilateral foreign aid agencies, appears 
to.be taking place in a number of countries,1 
• The fourth part of an improved system for taxing agriculture 
is an old favorite: a tax on the value of land._ The-virtues of the land 
• . -— 2 ' 
tax are well-known from other literature, and.include a- strong income 
effect which induces owners-to increase the output per unit of land and 
to market increased amounts of output in order to pay the land tax. With 
increased concern about questions of income distribution, and employment, 
the land tax takes on some added significance.. A. tax on the value of 
30 
agricultural land would raise the cost of not using lend most productively 
relative to labor and capital, and would encourage more intensive land 
use. This would especially affect larger land-owners who may be 
under-utilizing land and who would have added reason (with an effective 
land tax) eitherto cultivate more intensively themselves or to_incrgase 
the tenant population on their lands,1 
There are considerable problems iri introducing progressivety 
into 'systems of land taxation, as is well known from the literature. 
However, some form of land tax progressivaty would be most desirable 
from the point of view of' its employment effects, its complementarity 
to land reform policy and its effects on equity. Recent papers on 
2 
Pakistan and Colombia, as well as numerous earlier studies,- point., 
to the desirability of increasing the rate of tax as size of holdings 
increases, but there are always problems in combining a tax on land with 
a tax on persons. Some variant on the type of "agricultural income tax" 
whxen is used ill parts of the South Asian "Subcontinent may - be appropriate. 
This tax is in effect a progressive surtax on land tax paid. The rate 
of "agricultural income tax" (which is of course-misnamed), increases as 
the total amount of lend tax paid by any single reporting unit increased. 
To ensure effective enforcement, it would be necessary to combine 'a. 
progressive-land tax surcharge system with that of the income tax, thus 
making some crosschecks available with another system of collection and 
helping to ensure that ownership was' translated into spending or income 
units that could be-taxed.-
- ' Despite a fairly widespread agreement on the desirable 
features of some kind of tax on agricultural land related not to actual 
but to potential value of output there has certainly been no comparable 
widespread move to introduce or to improve land tax systems. The 
fundamental problems are political ones, though there are also some major 
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administrative problems in countries that do not have eastablished land 
records and surveys. However, the administrative problems are worth 
trying to overcome if one thinks of a reasonable time horizon for tax 
reforms and for an ed.uring system of taxation to be established. With 
the alarming and increasing population pressure on land, the virtues of 
a land tax, especially one in which progressivity can be included, are 
worth the initial administrative outlays. As is so often the case with 
basic tax reform questions- one cones back to politics as a constraint. 
The fifth element in an improved system is a resonably 
progressive income tax that includes incomes from agriculture in taxable 
1 
income. In thinking about planning over one or two decadcs, an 
objective to. move an increasing segment of the population into a tax 
system which is reasonably flexible and progressive should get some 
priority in fiscal reform. Such a tax system can. not reach down terribly 
far in the income levels of most developing countries because of the 
administrative costs relative to the tax collections. But, it would be 
a way of ensuring that governments will share in productivity increases 
at least of larger farmers. In addition, there are several aspects 
of an overall tax system that are significantly improved if a basic and 
established income tax is in operation. The tie-in with the land tax 
has been discussed; there would be connections with capital gains taxation 
as well. 
Introduction or improvement of capital gains taxation is a sixth 
aspect of improving the mechnisns for taxing agriculture, .As discussed 
in the last section, the absence of taxation of capital gains makes the 
less-productive use of agricultural land more attractive for those whose 
demand for current income is not high. The use of both land taxation and., 
capital gains taxation would be complementary to other efforts to promote 
more intensive use of land; and the use of a higher price of foreign 
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exchange and of excise or purchase taxes on machinery and equipment 
that may be labor displacing would tend to make the increased Intensity 
of cultivation of lc.nd result in more application of labor to the land 
as well. 
Questions of Expenditure Policy 
In addition to the above suggestions for revising the manner 
in which countries have tried to move resources from agriculture through 
uSe of taxes and related policies, there are some changes which may be 
warranted on the expenditure side of government policy as well. 
^Piilgt, there have been increasing questions raised in recent 
years about the desirability of using subsidies to agricultural inputs and 
to agricultural credit. One can hardly get into the debate properly in a 
short space. However, the use of below—market interest rates (especially 
when borrowers are the more wealth, farmers), the sale of irrigation water 
at below its opportunity cost (as occurs in India and Pakistan), and 
similar use of subsidized prices that must be accompanied by non-price 
rationing systems clearly present situations in which government revenues 
can be increased by higher charges, which will simultaneously improve 
resource allocation by penalizing'low-productivity uses of scarce 
resources. The question of using subsidized prices to encourage adoption 
of yield-increasing innovations by farmers falls more properly in Eaj 
Krishna's paper for the conference. However, to the extent that use of 
subsidies and taxes will induce farmers to undertake socially productive i 
innovations that they might otherwise have avoided, it is relevant to the 
subject of this paper that resources be available to the government 
sector to finance such policies, Tims part of the gross tranfer from 
agriculture may come back through use of subsidies; and to the extent that 
government resource constraints might limit the productive use of subsidies, 
the failure to extract a gross transfer _£can_ agriculture night limit . . 
agricultural growth, 
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A sesmd—OBfiect of expenditure policy lias already been referred 
1 to in section IV, An expanding agricultural sector will need a variety 
of government services and capital projects that will require government 
expenditures if agricultural growth., is not to be inhibited, The mix of 
capital projects, government research efforts, extension services, etc,, 
will vary from country to country and over time. However, the lack of 
government finance to provide such services will lower the rate of 
agricultural growth, and again the taxation of the agricultural sector may 
provide the public resources to .allow capital formation to accelerate 
agricultural growth,1 
The third opportunity for expenditure policy may appear in 
countries undergoing rapid productivity growth in foodgrain production. 
As a part of the transition from food imports to self-sufficiency or even 
to exports, there may be a need to adjust domestic prices of goodgrains 
to world prices at a satisfactory price of foreign exchange. The 
possibility of abrupt declines in Jooagrain prices has induced some 
countries to opt for price support systems which at best are a temporary 
drain on public resources, and at worst involve serious financing 
balance of payments, and resource allocation implications as well. In 
the face of sharp increases in domestic production caused by productivity 
gains from new varieties or new technologies in agriculture, governments 
have an opportunity to undertake needed labor-intensive public-works 
investments and finance them from domestic borrowing without additional 
tax revenue. The increased demand for foodgrains from the labor employed 
on the projects will provide some support for foodgrain prices, and instead 
of government expenditures on. increasing inventories of foodgrains held 
(with no employment created) there is an increase, in the productive capital 
2 
stock and an employment, of labor as well. The parallel with similar uses 
of PL480 imports of foodgrains comes to mind, and it. may.be useful to 
- 34 
remember that some countries anticipated PL480 imports and used them to 
offset (in real terms) the wage costs of'public works projects, while in 
other countries there was simply a heavily subsidized distribution 
essentially as famine relief with little resulting capital formation. 
It Would be a pity if countries now facing an expansion of resources at 
very low opportunity cost were unable or unwilling to take advantage 'of • 
this means of increasing both the capital stock and employment. 
Private PLesource Transfers 
The transfer of resources from agriculture to the non-
agricultural sectors on private account has been neglected,- as have 
questions of the resources and incentives for private" saving and invest-
ment in agriculture. In part this is due to my ignorance in this area, but 
in part it is based on the observation that in the Indian and Pakistan 
Punjab, when investments were profitable (even under the adverse set 
of terms of trade for agriculture based on net'barter terms of trade 
analysis) the agricultural sector found"the resources to undertake 
investments,1 Thus, I think the^emphasis should" be on (i) public sector' 
resource transfers and (ii) a reasonable set of price incentives, and that 
the private capital needs of" agriculture are likely to be less critical 
a bottleneck, expecially if the government is providing research outputs 
of new and profitable crop varieties and technologies. 
Pie structuring of relative prices, particularly of capital-
goods and agricultural implements, may also have some implications for the 
transfer of resources from agriculture on private capital account. The 
'study by Kaneda and Child points out the importance of family finance 
in the development of small-scale agriculturally based industry in the 
Pakistan Pubjab.2' "Efcrae's stud" of the development of the Indian Punjab 
emphasizes that industrialization there was closely related to agriculture 
and that it was located in smaller towns, as was the case with much of the 
industry in the Pakistan Punjab, If government policies discriminate 
loss against local production of equipment for agriculture, there may be 
a flow of private agricultural capital to profitable investment in the non-
agricultural sectors closer to home, where rates of return are higher and 
perceived risks are lower than would be the case with the institutional 
types of investment in non-agricultural sectors normally open to fanners. 
Results in both India and Pakistan suggest that the semi—rural type of 
non-agricultural growth is-fairly labor—intensive, _as_wel1 * 
Finally, there arc non-capital transfers between sectors, 
particularly remittances from the non-agricultural sector back to the 
farm. Those transfers are important for the welfare implications of 
policies aimed at transferring income out of agriculture, particularly 
where such policies encourage the increase in urban wages. While 
transfers from urban workers back to rural areas will not mitigate the 
effects of high wages on capital-labor substitution, they will help ensure 
that the agricultural sector shares in the increase in urban wage rates, 
which, mitigates the adverse effects on the size distribution of income 
of increasing the wages of the already high—wage sector. Thus, in evaluating 
the net effects of policies for transforing income through the price system, 
or the "invisible tranfer" that Lee discusses, it is necessary to take 
account of these transfers as well. That they can be important is 
indicated by a recent study in Kenya suggesting that about 20 percent of 
2 the wage bill earned by Africans in Nairobi was remitted to rural areas. 
CTO7CLCTI1IG OBSERVATIONS 
In the past few years considerable attention has been riven to 
the adverse effects on output and employment growth in non—agricultural 
sectors from the distorted set of prices they faced - distorted, that is, 
from international trade opportunity costs. A considerable literature has 
also developed emphasizing that both farmers and industrialists react to 
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price signals rather rapidly, so that the prices facing the private sector 
must be carefully considered as a part of government development policy. 
As a result of the difficulties encountered bjr some countries using seriously 
price-distorting policies, there has been considerable movement among a 
number of countries toward removing some of the distortions, particularly 
in adjusting the price of foreign exchange facing exporters so as to 
reduce the bias in favor of import subsitution and against exports. 
Perhaps it is now time to raise a warning that distortions of 
the prices of major agricultural commodities av/ay from international trade 
opportunity costs may be even more dangerous in its short-run balance of 
payments implications than distortions within the manufacturing sector, d 
dtie largely to the relative importance of the two sectors in the 
production of tradables. The danger is particularly serious with regard 
to the reactions in countries undergoing rapid productivity change in 
agriculture, the more so the farther a,re existing exchange rates from 
reflecting the value of foreign exchange to the economy; the total size 
of subsidies needed to keep agricultural prices above world piices at the 
official exchange rate, and the implications ol this for the rest of v u-f^ r 
are substantial. 
government financ^/ Finally, inappropriate choices of factor combinations, 
particularly the substitution of capital for labor also present more 
serious problems for the future of employment growth when it is the 
largest employment sector that is making the inapropriate choice, rather t r 
than the small modern manufacturing sector. 
For all these reasons, the dangers of major price distortions . 
within the agricultural sector may be more serious than similar distortions 1 
in the non-agricultural sector. The only counteracting factor is that 
agricultural land and much of the reproducible capital stock in agriculture 
except that in tree crops would be less product-specific than the capital 
stock in manufacturing, so that changes in the composition of agricultural 
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output could be made relatively fast as price distortions are corrected. 
There continues to be substantial scope in a great many 
countries for government intervention through the tax system both; to. 
increase tax revenue and to improve the allocation of resources by 
correcting the prices that face the private sector. Some of these 
changes in tax rates'would strike directly at prices paid by some or 
all farmers for goods they buy. Others would reduce the rates of 
protection being received by the non-agricultural sectors, which would 
tend to lighten the burden of subsidy to those sectors being borne by 
agriculture. The rapid productivity increases now being experienced 
in agriculture in some countries will make it much more feasible, for 
agriculture to contribute a rising amount of resource transfer to the 
government and to the non-agricultural sectors, but a, movement_away 
from some of the policies of price distortion among internationally 
tradable goods is necessary if the transfers of agriculture are to be 
effective in raising growth rates of output and employment in non-
agriculture and in sustaining agricultural growth itself in the coming 
decade. 
- i8 -
FOOTNOTES 
Pa^ol 
1» See S.E. Lewis, Jr, "Agricultural Taxation in a Developing 
Ec ononis'-'''. 
2, W, Arthur Lewis. "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies 
of Labour"o 
Pa ce, 2. 
1. See, for cxampl e, John C.N. Fei and Gustav Ranis, Development 
' Sccnongj .Theory and_ Policy; or John W. 
Hell or and Uma J. Lele, A_ Lab or. Supply The ory_ of. Economic 
Develppment. 
2» Simon Kuznets, Modern Econoniic, Growth, and other references 
cited thereino 
/ 
/ - • • . . . • / * 
3", B.F. Johnson and J.W. Mcllor, "The Role of Agriculture in 
Economic Development" is the standard source. 
4„ See "WoHo Nicholls, "An 1 Agricultural Surplus' as a Factor in 
Economic Development", and, for an interesting comparative 
study, A.M. Tang, "Agriculture in the Industrialization of 
Communist China and the Soviet Union". 
Rtgo 3 
1. J.C.H. Fei and G. Ranis, Development and Employment in Open 
Dualistic Economy". 
2. Sec Tang, o^^citand S»R<, Lewis, op., cit. 
Page 4 
1. W.A. Lewis, "A Review of Economic Development;" Some^ .Aspects,,of 
Econornic Deyel.opmenj.1 and summary paper on the IiL.O. World 
Employment Program in International, Labor, Reviqw, Kay 1970. 
2. The recent paper by Mcllor and Lele, .op.._,.cit. incorporates an 
explicit landlord sector into the agricultural sector. Their 
device allows more explicit and careful analysis of the effects 
of various'tax policies on resource allocation, choice of 
techniques, and levels of marketing in the agricultural sector. 
S.R. Lewis, bjc^ cit^  
One should, make allowance for some contribution of agriculture 
to the production of "pure" public goods such as defense as 
well as for the benefits from projects or services that benefit 
onljr agriculture. Some of the incidence problems on'the tax 
side of the calculation are discussed by V.P. Gandhi, Tax Burden 
_Gn__Indi an .Agri. cultjure» 
S.R. Lewis, op.cit. 
ToH. Lee, Intersectoral Capital Flows in the Economic 
oment of Taiwan. 
An interesting discussion of the optimality problem is given in 
Tang, o£i£it° See also M.I. Khan, "A Model of Optimal Resource' 
Transfer from Agriculture for the Benefit of Honagricultural 
Activities", and Johnston and Kilby. 
Some of these issues arc discussed in H.J. Bruton, "Import 
Substitution and Productivity Growth". It is important to 
point out,'however, that growth of value added per worker is 
not enough, since this can take place through capital-labor 
substitution or other means. What is necessary is that the 
total resource cost (inputs and factors) of producing a given 
quantity of output must fall for the burden of subsidy to 
d_ecrease. 
Che is interested in trade opportunity costs, so where import 
supply elasticities and export demand elasticities are less 
than infinite, the trade opport-unity costs are given by marginal 
revenues or costs rather than prices. 
B. Balassa and Associates, The Structure of Protection in 
Developing Countries. 
I.M.D. Little, T. Scitovsky and M.F.G. Scott, jndusjLry,and 
Trade. _ijo__Some_ Dp-veloPing. C.Qugtjries. 
S.R. Lewis, Jr. "Interrelations Between Agricultural and. 
Industrial Development: Discussion"; and P^igtanj.Jndustria-
lization and Trade Policies. 
~ 40 -
4« SoMo Eddie, ""The Terras of Trade as a Tax on Agriculture; 
Hungary's Trade with Austria, 1883-1913". His study 
distinguishes between the effects On major grains, where 
producers had some political power, and other exports, where 
they did not. 
1» Lee , opj.cit, 
2. HoP. Echevarra, "The Effect of Agricultural Price Policies on 
Intersectoral Income Transfers". This study has the virtue 
that it differentiates among largo and small producers, tenants, 
agricultural and non-agricultural workers, non-agricultural 
producers and the rest of the world. 
Page 13 
1. To the extent that capital is mobile, disincentives to 
agricultural investment might result in a shift to non-
agricultural investment. It might also he that lower rates 
of return on agricultural investment would result in higher 
consumption and lower saving by farmers. 
2. The "effective rate of protection" or the protection to value 
added is designed to measure the combined effects of nominal 
protection to output and the presence of tariffs on or 
protection to industries producing inputs into the protected 
industry. The concepts are discussed and elaborated in 
Balassa and Associates, op..c.it._ and Little, Scitovsky and 
Scott, op.cit. 
3, Even in this case, to the extent that the protection raised 
the private rate of return artificially above that of'projects 
with equivalent social rates of return in agriculture, overall 
growth would be lower if capital moved in response to private 
rates of return. 
4, See Balassa and Associates, op.cit. and Little et.al ^ J^cijt. 
Page 14 
1, The impact of the growing need for subsidy may show up in' 
the form of foreign exchange shortages, inadequate saving,-• 
inflation arising from excessive creation of factor payments 
domestically relative to productivity of factors, or a 
combination of all. Some of the problems are discussed by 
JoH. Power, "Industrialisation in Pakistan? A case of Frustrated 
Take-off?" or J.B. Sheahan,. "Imports, Investment and Growth: 
The Colombian Experience since 1950". 
~ 41 -
1„ Little et.al op_._cit• PP<>75-76 
2* In addition to the references to Power and Sheahan, see A.O. 
Hirsoilman s "The Political Economy of Import Substituting 
Industrialization in Latin America." 
3. The deceleration may also be brought on by the limitations of 
markets at the distorted prices prevailing: import substitutes 
run out of a growing market after imports have been replaced, 
and the currency overvaluation, the high cost-structure of 
protected industries, and the higher labor costs that often .. 
accompany the import substitution phase eliminate the 
possibility of entering the export market. 
Again see W.A. Lewis* more recent contributions. 
Page 16 
1. See CcH. Gfotsch andW.P. Falcon, "Optimal'Cropping Patterns., 
in the Kixed Farming Areas of the Punjab", and W.P. Falcon, 
"Hie Green Revolution: Generations of Problems," 
Pajre 
1. See C.H. Gotsch and W.P. Falcon, _A.gr ijsult.ural._ Frioo. Policy, 
and, the. Seye_lojoment of West_ JPakistan, Vol. I and Vol II 
2. Ibid. To some extent the added sensitivity comes from the lack 
of specificity of the now technologies (i.e. tubewell water that 
can be applied to supplement many crops, so cropping patterns 
are not tied to timing of canal irrigation or rainsj or new 
varieties have different growing seasons from traditional varieties 
and may affect profitability-of growing crops in seasons other 
than those in which they themselves-are grown). 
Phge 18 
1. Some of these issues are discussed for'West Pakistan in S.R. 
Lewis, Jr. W.P. Falcon and C.H. Gotsch, "A Commercial and 
Fiscal Policy for West Pakistan Agriculture in the 1970s". 
2. It seems reasonably'clear to me that the sudden increase in 
agricultural growth, combined with large inflows of foreign 
aid, provided the manufacturing sector in Pakistan with just 
„ . . such an increase in the source of subsidy in the early l§60s 
and put off the need to rationalize the sector', thus maintain-
ing the need to have a growing subsidy from the rest of the 
economy in order to expand. 
f ^ l M 
1, See Falcon, op.pit, and John W. lellor,"Technological Change 
in Agriculture and Intersectoral Resource Flows", 
points raised in this paragraph. 
- 42 -•• 
Pa^o 20 
1. Sog Mellor, "Technological Change," op.cit. Note too, . 
however, that the growing capital needs of agriculture wome' 
from increased highS3>-produotivity investment opportunities, 
thus raising- the opportunity «.ost of wasting resources in 
lower-productivity protected sectors. 
2, See Falcon, o^ci/t. and Mellor and Lele, oj^ .^ cit. 
3« Falcon, pp..citt. 
Pa^e 22 
1, See H, Kaneda and FoC„ Child, "Small-scale, Agriculturally 
Related Industry in'the Punjab", or C, Eicher, T. Zalla, 
J. Kocher, F, Winch, Bnplpyment. Cjener at ion in Africa 
Agriculture. 
23 
1„ Kaneda and Child, op«oit. 
Page 24 
1, This point is also emphasized in ScR. Lewis, Jr. and S.E. 
2. 
Guisinger, "The Structure of Protection in Pakistani 
See, for example, R.A. Berry, "On the Usefulness of c 
Presumptive Tax on Agricultural Land in Colombia", 
PageJ£ 
1, 
Page.27 
1. 
On the general point see, interalia, S.R. Lewis, 
"Agricultural Taxation", pjJ.pit« On the relation to 
Japan, BoF, Johnston "Agricultural Productivity in Japan" 
is the standard source. For a rccent review, se.e U.J«— 
Lelc} "Agricultural Resource Transfers and Agricultural 
Development; A Brief Review of Experience in Japan, England, 
and France's 
See Lewis 
opocit, 
Falcon and Gotsch, op.cit.. or Johnston'and Kilby, 
ote also that the protection system, that defends 
the overvaluation must correspondingly be changed. 
2. That these should be used selectively and onl^ to correct for 
differences between price and marginal revenue should be stressed 
in light of the number of countries that have overused export 
taxes in the past fifteen or twenty years. 
- 43 -•• 
A large devaluation with a failure to change tariff levels would 
lead to an increase in foreign exchange, reserves, which may he 
suitable luxury'consumption for nco—mercantilist nations of t'.. 
developed world, hut is a waste of resources for the. LLCs. 
2* This assertion of the results assumes that the country does 
not produce much of the intermediate and capital goods that 
are discriminated against b.3r the tariff system so that the higher 
costs of protection arc paid by the agricultural sector, rather 
than by some substantial portion of manufacturing. 
See S„ Bose and E«!I» 01 ark, "Some Basic Considerations on 
Agricultural Mechanization in West Pakistan," Kaneda and Child, 
pp.cit^, Johnston and Kilby, or_»_cit_. and Eicher et.al. .op..pit. 
2. See Lewis, "Agricultural Taxation," op_.cit. and H.F. Wald, 
Taxation of Agricultural. Land, in. Underdevelppe_d Countries. 
Pa^e_28 
1. 
Page 2£ 
1. 
Ri^eJO 
1« 
j < 
See Berry, op^cit. for a good recent discussion with reference 
to Colombia. 
Berry, _op.».o.it. or.S»E. Lewis, W.P„ Falcon and C.H. Gotsch, 
"The Tax Structure of•West Pakistan Agriculture; Some Proposals". 
Lewi s, Falcon^and-Get-sch, "Tax StrHaretu3ae-"yyor^ .jcitj» 
Pa-::o 31 
1. One of the difficulties with direct taxation of agriculture 
in India and Pakistan is that agricultural incomes are not 
taxable under federal law; taxation of agriculture is a 
provincial subject. For a suggested way around this problem, 
see Lewis, Falcon and Gotsuh, pp..cit. 
Page, 33. 
It is again worth stating that a presumption of a gross flow of 
resources out of agriculture during development does not mean 
that there may be a net inflow on government account; or that 
the not outflow need be large on government account. 
This is discussed by Falcon, 'pPjjp.it. and by S.R. Lewis, Jr., 
W.P. Falcon, and C.E. Gotsch, "The Green Revolution and FL48OS 
Some Parallel Problems?". 
- 44 -•• 
Page .3,4, 
1. On. investment in agriculture, see, for example, Ghulam Mohammad, 
"Private Tubewcll Development and Cropping Patterns in West 
Pakistan;" on investment in non-agriculture, sec Kaneda and' 
Child, op. pit.; both subjects are referred to in J. Macrae, 
"The Relationship between Agricultural and Industrial Growth, 
with special reference to the Development of the Punjab 
Economy from 1950 to 1 965 , " 
Kaneda and Child, op. oit0 
1. Macrae, op. cit. 
2, GoE. Johnson and W.E. Whitelaw, "The Determination of Urban-
Rural Income Transfers in Kenya: An Estimated Remittances 
Function." I.D.S. Discussion Paper Wo. 137° 
Page. 36 
1. U0J0 Lele, "Agricultural Contribution and Agricultural 
. Development: A Brief Review of Resource Transfer Experience 
in Japan, England, and France," argues that .protection of 
agriculture in Franco led to a failure of growth in agriculture 
as well as in industry. 
-45-
B ^ W C E S 
B. Balassa and Associates, The Structure, of Protootjon -in Sevolpmng 
Countries» Baltimore, 1971• 
R.A. Berry. "On the Usefulness of a Presumptive Tax on Agricultural Land 
in Columbia", Discussion Paper Ho. 101. Economic Growth 
Center. Yale University, October 1970, 
S, Bose and E.H. Clark. "Some Basic Considerations on Agricultural 
Mechanization in West Pakistan", Pakistan Development 
Review, Autumn 1969• 
H.J, Bruton. "Import Substitution and Productivity Growth." Journal of. 
Development Studies, April 1968. 
RoP. Echovarria. "The Effcct of Agricultural Price Policies on Inter-
sectoral Income Transfers", Occasional Paper ITo. 30 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell' University, 
Ithaca, Hew York, June 1970. 
S.M. Eddie. "The Terms of Trade as a Tax on Agriculture: Hungary's 
Trade with Austria, 1883 - 1913". (mimeo) University of 
Toronto, July 1971. 
C. Eicher, T. Zalla, J. Kocher, P. Winch, Staiployraont. Generation in African 
Agriculture; Research Report Ho. 9 Institute of International 
Agriculture, Michigan State University, July 1970. . 
WeP, Falcon, "The Green Revolution? Generations of Problems". American 
Journal., of.„Agricultural Economics, December 1970, 
J.C.H. Fei.and G.. Ranis. "Development and Employment in Open Dualistic' 
Economy". Discussion Paper Ho. 110, Economic Growth Center, 
Yale University, April 1971. 
John C«H» Pei and Gust a* Ranis. Development 0f_.tJ1e_Jj.ab0r Surplus Eoonomy: 
l^ hepry .and Policy . Horr.ewood, ZLx , 1964. 
V«P® G-andhi, Tax Burden p"n Indian Agriculture. Harvard Law School 
. ... . , International Tax Program, Cambridge, Mass., 1966, 
C.H. Gotsoh. and W. P. Falcon. Agricultural foi be" .Policy and the. .Development 
Pj-West, Pakistan,, Vol*. I and VolII"("mimeo)* OSPIpCambridge 
Mass., 196"9 and 1970. 
C.H. Gotsoh and W.P, Falcon, "Optimal Cropping Patterns in the Mixed 
Farming Areas of the Punjab".' Working Paper Ho. 8a, 
August 1969, Ajgricultural,.Price. Policy and the Development • 
• of West Pakistan, Vol,II, oj^oit. : 
A«0« Hirscliman, "The" 'Political Economy of Import Substituting Industrializa-
tion in Latin America." .Quarterly Journal of Economics 
February 1968. 
G.E. Johnson and W.E., Whit claw. "Urban-Rural Income Transfers in Kenya: 
An Estimated Remittances Function", (mlmeo) Discussion Paper 
Ho. 137j Institute for Development Studies, Nairobi, Kenya • 
1971. 
- 46 -•• 
B.F. Johnston. "Agricultural Productivity and. Economic Development in 
Japan". Journal, of Ifolitical. Economy, December 1971. 
B.F. Johnston and. J.W. Mellor. "The Role of Agriculture in Economic 
Development". American Economic. Royiew, September, 1961. 
H. Kaneda and F.C. Child. "Small-scale, Agriculturally Related Industry 
in the Punjab," Working Paper No. 11, Department of 
Economicsj University of California, Davis, California, 
September, 1971. 
M.I. Khan. "A Model of Optimal Resource - Transfer from Agriculture 
for the Benefit of IT onagricultural Activities". Research 
Report No. 91» Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 
Karachi, Pakistan, April 1970. 
Simon Kuznots. Modern Economic Growth, New Haven, 1966. 
Intersc-ctoral Capital Flows'in the Economic De^ elpjpmpnt 
of Taiwan, Ithaca, New York, 1971* 
"Agricultural Resource Transfers and Agricultural Develop-
ment: A Brief Review of Experience in Japan, England, and 
France", Occasional Paper No.33, Department of Agricultural 
Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, June 1970. 
Jr. "Agricultural Taxation in a Developing Economy", in 
Agricultural Development and Economic Growth, H.M.Southworth 
and B.F. Johnston, eds. Ithaca, 1967° 
Jr. "Interrelations Between Agricultural and Industrial 
Development: Discussion", Journal of Farm Economics.' 
December, 1967« 
Jr. Pakistan: Industrialization and Trade- Policies, London, 
1970.' — - - -
Jr., W.P. Falcon, and C.H. Gotsch. "The Green Revolution ' 
and PL48O: Some Parallel Problems?" Working.Paper No.3, 
January 1969, Agricultural .Price Policy and The Development 
of West Pakistan, Vol.II op.cit. 
Jr., W.P. Falcon and C.H. Gotsch. "The Tax Structure of West 
Pakistan Agriculture: Some Proposals", Working Paper No.13, 
August I96Q, Agricultural .Price Policy and the Development 
of West Pakist.anfi Vol .II. op. cit. 
Jr., W.P. Falcon and. C.H. Gotsch. "A Commercial and Fiscal 
Policy for West Pakistan Agriculture in the 1970s". Summary 
Discussion Paper, August 1969? Agricultural Price Policy 
and the Development of West Pakistan. Vol.11, op. pit. 
Jr. and S.E. Cuisinger, "The Structure of Protection in 
Pakistan", in Balassa and Associates, The Structure of 
Protection in Developing Countries. Baltimore, 1971° 
W. Arthur Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of 
Labour". ^c.Jfen chest or. School, May 1954. 
T.H, Lee 
JJ.J. Lele. 
S.R. Lewis, 
S.R. Lewis, 
S.R. Lewis, 
S.R. Lewis, 
S.R. Lewis, 
S.R. Lewis, 
S.R. Lewis, 
- 47 -•• 
W.A. Lewis. "A Review of Economic Development", American Economic Review 
May, 1965. 
W.A. Lewis, Some Aspects of Economic Development, Accra, 1969* 
W.A. Lewis, "The World Employment Program"? International Labor 
Review, May 1970, 
I.M.D. Little , T, Scitovsky and M.F.G. Scott, Industry and Trade in 
Some Developing Countries, London, 1970, 
J, Macrae. "The Relationship between Agricultural and Industrial Growth, 
with special reference to the Development of the Punjab 
Economy from 1950 to 1965". Journal of Development Studies, 
July, 1971. 
,John W. Mellor. "Technological Change in Agriculture and Intersectoral 
Resource Plows". Occasional Paper No.34? Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 
June, 1970, 
John W, Mellor and Uma J. Lele. "A Labor Supply Theory of Economic Develop-
ment." Occasional Paper No.43j Department of Agricultural 
Ec onomics, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, June 1971° 
Ghulam Mohammad. "Private Tubewcll Development and Cropping Patterns in 
West Pakist Spring I965 
* 
W.H. Nicholls. "An 'Agricultural Surplus' as a Factor in'Economic ' 
Development", Journal of Political Economy, February, 1963. 
J.H. Power. "Industrialization in Pakistan: A Case of Frustrated Take-
off?", Pakistan Development Review, Winter 1964. 
J.B. Sheahan. "Imports, Investment and Growth: The Columbian Experience 
since 1950" 'Development Policy : Theory and Practice 
G.F. Papanok, ed. Cambridge, Masr* . , 1968 . 
A.M. Tang. "Agriculture in the Industrialization of Communist China 
and the Soviet Union". Journa_l_of F^m^Economics, December, 
1967o 
H.P. Wald. Taxation of AgriculturalLandi in Underdeveloped Countries 
Cambridge, Mass,"3959-
